Could the Brexit domino effect come back to haunt us? EPC Commentary April 2021. by Zuleeg, Fabian & Wachowiak, Jannike
COMMENTARY
Could the Brexit domino e�ect
come back to haunt us?
The common perception of  Brexit  as  a  failed  project  might  change over  time,
implying that its domino e�ect could still rear its ugly head.
The British vote to leave the European Union on 23 June 2016 sent a shockwave through
the other member states. At the time, the Leave campaign’s success triggered fears of a
domino e�ect that would unravel the EU project. But against all expectations, Brexit has
neither  fuelled  anti-EU  sentiments  (https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
/en/publications/publication/did/�ashlight-europe-022016-brexit-has-raised-support-for-
the-european-union)  among Europeans nor  emboldened political  leaders  to  demand
their own country’s exit. On the contrary, the divisive nature of the British debate and
the reality of Brexit has had a deterrent e�ect.
Nevertheless, the Brexit domino e�ect could still return if Boris Johnson continues to
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escape any accountability and retells the Brexit story uncontested.
The reverse domino e�ect
From  the  continent,  Brexit  continues  to  look  like  an  act  of  self-harm  with  severe
economic and political costs, including the distinct possibility that it might actually pave
the way for the break-up of the United Kingdom. While the EU is also weakened by the
loss  of  one of  its  largest  member states,  the impact  is  less  severe as  it  secured an
agreement that safeguards its vital interests. Brexit remains an existential challenge for
the UK but manageable for the EU.
This is partly thanks to how the EU handled the issue. Faced with a potentially existential
threat, the EU displayed an unprecedented level of unity, with member states gathering
behind the European Commission’s negotiating strategy. The excruciating British debate
highlighted  the  economic  and  political  costs  of  being  a  third  country  –  that  EU
membership matters  –,  leaving the remaining members  with  a  sense of  vindication.
However, the EU should be careful not to become too complacent and continue to pay
close  attention  to  the  EU–UK  relationship  (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/The-
EUUK-relationship-It-is-what-it-is~3bb140), as the feared domino e�ect may still rear its
ugly head .
Shaping the Brexit narrative
The EU clearly has a desire to close this regrettable chapter of European (dis-)integration
and relegate the EU–UK relationship to a third-order issue, preferably to be dealt with by
the  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement’s  (TCA)  technical  committees.  But  recent
disputes, be it on COVID-19 vaccine supply chains (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications
/EU-crash-course-in-geopolitics-Lessons-from-the-foreign-policy-battl~3d1e7c)  or  the
implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol, have demonstrated that both sides’
political engagement, and not just technical management, will be needed.
The EU’s UK strategy should account for a partner whose approach to EU–UK relations,
and therefore to problem-solving, remains above all political and �rmly focused on the
domestic  audience.  The  current  UK  government,  supported  by  parts  of  the  British
media, will continue to politicise its relationship with the EU and weave the narrative of
Brexit as a success story. For the sake of his political survival, Boris Johnson will paint
every British success as a Brexit dividend and blame any negative impact on the EU.
Meanwhile, Brexit will drop o� the EU27’s agenda. This will make it more di�cult for the
EU bodies monitoring the EU–UK relationship (e.g. the newly established Service for the
EU–UK  Agreements,  or  UKS)  to  cut  through  the  noise  and  communicate  a  uni�ed
message in the face of  European ‘Brexit  fatigue’  and other,  more pressing priorities.
Consequently, the UK narrative will be largely uncontested.
This website us s cookies. By continuing to use this website you are givi g consent to cookies bei g used.
accept & close
 
Could the Brexit domino effect come back to haunt us? https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Could-the-Brexit-domino-effect-com...
2 of 5 12/13/2021, 2:22 PM
Perception matters (more?)
As a result of Brexit, the UK will be relatively poorer in the long run. However, once the
immediate economic chaos subsides, exceedingly few will compare the new status quo
to what would have been if the UK remained an EU member. And against the backdrop
of the COVID-19-induced economic crisis, the exact impact of Brexit will be more di�cult
to discern than otherwise.
Furthermore,  the  UK  will  not  be  the  only  European  country  navigating  economic
di�culties.  An  underperforming  Eurozone,  even  if  due  to  other  structural  reasons,
would be a useful pawn in the Brexit success story.
Finally,  following the Brexit  slump, the UK economy will  start to grow again. While it
might still be relatively weaker than if it had not exited the Union, it will nevertheless feel
like progress and growth and be sold as such by the Conservative Party at the next
election.
In the end, it could be political factors, rather than economic ones, that will crucially tip
the scales of the public verdict on Brexit over time. How easily public perceptions can be
swayed is  observable in European reactions to the UK’s successful  vaccine rollout.  A
major German tabloid’s headline of “Dear Brits, we envy you” sums up the mood in the
continent, while almost two-thirds of British respondents (https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2021-04-12/-hostile-eu-s-vaccine-spat-with-u-k-boosts-support-for-
brexit?sref=u1qyM5yV) credit the success to Brexit.
So far,  the UK’s  decision to leave the Single  Market  and Customs Union has mainly
produced losers. But this cannot be said for Johnson – his association with the hard
Brexit  brand has served him well.  If  he were to continue as party leader and prime
minister, winning a second term on the back of the consolidation of Brexit, his success
might spark other Eurosceptic leaders’ interests. The return of the domino e�ect could
loom large once again.
Nevertheless, Johnson’s political success rests on shaky foundations. The full e�ects of
Brexit have not yet entered the British public’s conscience, as the pandemic serves as a
distraction and delays its impact on everyday lives (e.g. travel). A change of mood that
results in Johnson and his party being booted out of power would seal the fate of Brexit
being branded a ‘bad idea’. Perhaps even more crucially, should he fail to manage the
aftershocks of his sovereignty-�rst, hard Brexit, polarisation could see the departure of
Scotland and the  reuni�cation of  Ireland.  The break-up of  the  UK would  likely  bury
Johnson’s political career as well as cement Brexit’s fate as a failed project.
If, however, Brexit is perceived in a few years as having served the UK (and those who
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came  to  power  in  its  wake)  economically  and  politically  well,  it  might  embolden
Eurosceptic demands for ‘less Brussels’. It could eventually lead to changing majorities in
the  European  Parliament  and/or  the  election  of  a  Eurosceptic  head  of  state  in  an
important member state (e.g. France). While these developments would not necessarily
lead  to  further  disintegration  of  the  EU,  they  could  paralyse  its  decision-making
processes  and damage its  capacity  to  act.  Many member states  could demand ‘less
Europe’ and speci�c concessions in return for staying put.
Renewed fears of a domino e�ect would bleed into EU–UK relations
The return of the Brexit domino e�ect would inevitably bleed into the overall EU–UK
relationship  and  decrease  the  prospects  of  improving  the  TCA  over  time.  The  deal
foresees a review every �ve years. They may occur in a highly politicised context: the
next UK general election and European Parliament election is most likely to occur in the
year  before  the  �rst  review.  If  the  Conservative  Party  wins  the  general  election  by
reviving  old  Brexit  battle  lines  successfully,  the  continent’s  Eurosceptic  parties  could
jump back on the Brexit bandwagon in time for the European Parliament election. In
which case, the EU would have little appetite to improve TCA conditions – rather the
contrary. The current arrangements could collapse, reviving the spectre of the no-deal
Brexit. 
Membership must matter
Going forward, the EU should pay attention to how the perception of Brexit evolves. It
should also ensure a united approach towards the UK and solidarity with those member
states that are most a�ected by Brexit’s economic and political repercussions.
The lessons from the Michel Barnier era should be brought into this new, post-Brexit
phase:  ensure  a  clear  mandate  for  the  new UKS,  transparency,  and the  continuous
coordination of and consultation with the EU member states and institutions. This will
also  help  the  new  EU–UK  arrangements  from  getting  swept  up  in  other  issues
inadvertently, as has been the case with the supply of COVID-19 vaccines, or Article 16 of
the  Northern  Ireland  Protocol.  Even  if  Brexit  is  no  longer  an  EU  priority,  the
management of EU–UK relations should stay on message, sending a clear signal to the
UK  and  EU27  that  EU  membership  matters  and  that  the  evolving  relationship  will
maintain a balance between rights and obligations.
More broadly,  the belief  that EU membership counts will  only stick if  the Union can
prove that it can deal with global trends and transformations that cannot be addressed
at the national level e�ectively. This would be the best defence against a Eurosceptic
tide. However, if the EU does not demonstrate that it is the best answer to these threats,
the Eurosceptic challenge might well return stronger than ever.
This website us s cooki s. By c ntinuing to use this w bsite you are giving co ent to cookies being u ed.
accept & close
 
Could the Brexit domino effect come back to haunt us? https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Could-the-Brexit-domino-effect-com...
4 of 5 12/13/2021, 2:22 PM
Jannike  Wachowiak  is  a  Policy  Analyst  in  the  Europe’s  Political  Economy
programme.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive of the EPC.
The  support  the  European  Policy  Centre  receives  for  its  ongoing  operations,  or
speci�cally for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents,
which re�ect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held
responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.
Photo credits:
PIXABAY
This website uses cookies. By continuing to use this website you are giving consent to cookies being used.
accept & close
 
Could the Brexit domino effect come back to haunt us? https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Could-the-Brexit-domino-effect-com...
5 of 5 12/13/2021, 2:22 PM
